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RECENT DECISIONS
gaining agreement frustrates the aim of the statute to secure industrial
peace through collective bargaining.16 Administrative agencies deal-
ing with labor relations before the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act had adopted the settled practice of treating the signing
of a written contract as the final step in the bargaining process.17
Congress, by incorporating in the National Labor Relations Act the
collective bargaining requirements of the earlier statutes,18 included as
a part thereof the signed agreement.' 9
B.B.
NEGLIGENCE-HOSPITALS-CIRCU MSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONSTI-
TUTING A PRIMA FAClE CAsE.-Plaintiffl was admitted to defendant
hospital one morning at 8:00 A. M. to undergo an operation. At
about 5:30 P. M., a hospital attendant hung an electric light lamp.
having a reflector on top of the bedstead at the foot of the bed. Plain-
tiff was taken to the operating room at about 8:00 P. M., and at that
time the lamp was still hanging on the end of the bed. For purposes
of the operation, he was given a spinal anesthetic which "deadened" his
body from about the middle thereof to the end of his feet. When one
hour later he was brought back to his room by two attendants, he was
put into bed and covered with a sheet and spread. At about midnight
plaintiff felt a burning sensation in his feet and complained to the
nurse who, upon lifting the bed clothes, found the electric light lamp.
His foot was severely burned, and he now seeks to recover damages
for his injury. Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to state a
prima facie case as it contains no proof (a) that the burn was caused
by the lamp and (b) that the lamp was placed in a position to burn his
foot as a result of the negligence of any person for whose act or omis-
sion defendant is liable. The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment
of the trial term dismissing the complaint. Held, reversed, and new
trial granted. Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital & Dispensary, 284
N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d) 373 (1940).
A hospital, whether charitable or private, is immune from liability
for the negligence of its doctors or nurses with respect to any matter
relating to a patient's medical care and attention.' This exemption
26 See notes 14, 15, supra.
17N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. (2d) 632, 638 (C. C. A.
4th, 1940).
Is See note 17, supra.19 See notes 14, 17, supra.
1 CLERK AND LINDSELL, TORTS (9th ed.) 274 ("The law appears to be that
while a hospital authority may not be liable for medical treatment by doctors or
nurses, provided reasonable care has been exercised in their selection it will be
liable for any of their negligent acts or omissions not directly concerned with
medical treatment but in respect to which the doctors and nurses could be con-
sidered as servants-of the authority").
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is granted because of the nature of the hospital's undertaking to its
patients, merely to supply independent contractors who will heal .or
attempt to heal on their own responsibility. 2 In the present case,
however, no immunity has been claimed, for the act is of a kind per-
formed by a servant, and it is undisputed that such acts render the
hospital liable.3  The liability depends not so much upon the title of
the individual whose act or omission causes the injury as upon the
character of the act itself.4
On plaintiff's appeal from dismissal at close of his case, he must
receive the advantage of every inference properly deducible from
facts presented which must be deemed true.3 The facts alleged may
be established by direct or circumstantial evidence or both.6 With
this in mind, the facts alleged have proven that the burn was caused by
the lamp. Plaintiff had no burn when put into bed after the operation,
and while in bed felt a burning sensation. The lamp was then removed
from the vicinity of his foot; the heat pain abated, and a severe burn
was noticed. It was also proven that the burn was of a kind which
could be caused by the lamp in question. Such a chain of evidence
must be deemed sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the lamp
caused the injury. To hold otherwise and to determine as a matter of
law that the foregoing evidence is insufficient would impose an unduly
stringent standard greatly in excess of the requirements of reasonable
proof.7 The right of the jury to reason from established facts to a
conclusion has been too long established to require citation of authority.
The proof was also sufficient to permit the jury to find that the
injury-was caused by defendant's servants. Plaintiff is not required
to offer evidence positively excluding every other possible cause of the
accident.8 It is enough that he show facts and conditions from which
the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by
that negligence may be reasonably inferred.9 It is not enough that
the defendant, in an effort to break the chain of causation, should prove
that plaintiff's injury might have resulted from other possible causes.
The existence of remote possibilities that factors other than the negli-
gence of the defendant may have caused the accident does not require
a holding that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case.10
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it supports the inference of
2 Steinert v. Brunswick Home, 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (1939).
s Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E.(2d) 28 (1937).
4 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).5 Feiber v. Copeland, 232 App. Div. 504, 250 N. 7. Supp. 429 (1st Dept
1931) ; Wechsler v. United Produce Dealers Ass'n, 126 Misc. 563, 214 N. Y.
Supp. 136 (1926).
6 Faulkinbury v. Shaw, 183 Ark. 1019, 39 S. W. (2d) 708 (1931).
7 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 41.
8 Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N. Y. 162, 183 N. E. 282 (1932).
9 Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920).




causation or of negligence even though it does not negative the exis-
tence of remote possibilities."
R. E. B.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-DECLARATION oF DIVIDENDS-SOURCE
-GoOD-WILL-UNREALIZED APPREcIATIoN.-Plaintiff, as Trustee in
Bankruptcy of the Bush Terminal Company, brings this action against
former directors of the corporation to recover on its behalf the amount
of cash dividends declared and distributed during the years 1928-1932
aggregating $3,639,058.06. The defendant directors are sought to be
held personally liable under Section 581 of the Stock Corporation
Law, as it existed when the dividends here involved were declared
and paid. Plaintiff claims: that, although the company's books
showed a surplus at the times of the declarations and payments, there
was in fact no surplus; and that the capital was actually impaired by
the full amount of each of the dividends declared in violation of
Section 58. In 1902 defendant Irving T. Bush controlled the Bush
Company, Ltd. which was engaged in a going terminal enterprise on
the Brooklyn waterfront. This company owned warehouses, piers
and railroad facilities. During this year the Bush Terminal Com-
pany was formed, and Mr. Bush entered into a contract with the
newly formed company; pursuant to which it issued to Mr. Bush
$2,000,000 in bonds and $3,000,000 in par value common stock and
received, in addition to certain services of Mr. Bush, a large tract of
industrially improved land contiguous to that owned by the Bush Coin-
111ngersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. (2d) 828
(1938).
1 N. Y. STocK CoRp. LAw § 58, as it existed during the period involved here
provided as follows: "DIDENDs. No stock corporation shall declare or pay
any dividend which shall impair its capital or capital stock nor while its capital
or capital stock is impaired, ... unless the value of the assets remaining after
the payment of such dividend... shall be at least equal to the aggregate amount
of its debts and liabilities including capital or capital stock as the case may be.
In case any such dividend shall be paid... the directors in whose administration
the same shall have been declared or made, except those who may have caused
their dissent therefrom to be entered upon the minutes of the meetings of direc-
tors at the time or who were not present when such action was taken shall be
liable jointly and severally to such corporation and to the creditors thereof to
the full amount of any loss sustained by such corporation or by its creditors
respectively by reason of such dividend. .. ." Under this statute, good faith
on the part of directors in declaring such dividends was no defense to an action
for their recovery. Quintal v. Greenstein, 142 Misc. 854, 256 N. Y. Supp. 462,
aff'd, 236 App. Div. 719, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (1st Dept. 1932). By N. Y.
Lavs 1939, c. 364, §§ 1, 2, § 58 was amended so as to provide a defense to those
directors "who affirmatively show that they had reasonable grounds to believe,
and did believe, that such dividend . . . would not impair the capital of such
corporation." This amendment was expressly made inapplicable to dividends
declared and paid prior to its enactment, hence it does not affect the instant case.
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